Defending Against Sybil Attacks Using Sybil limit Protocol Project Report

Introduction to Defending Against Sybil Attacks Using Sybil limit Protocol Project:

There is always a threat to open-access distributed systems like peer-to-peer systems from Sybil attacks, where a ill-willed user creates many fake identities known as Sybil nodes. Unless a reliable central authority is organized to bond identities to real persons, safeguarding against Sybil attacks is a serious problem.

Amidst the limited dispersed approaches, our recent SybilGuard protocol uses a key perception on social networks to restrict the number of Sybil nodes acknowledged. In spite of its encouraging efforts, SybilGuard can permit many number of Sybil nodes to be acknowledged. Moreover, SybilGuard believes that social networks are fast-mingling, which has not been accepted in the actual world.

This project deals with the SybilLimit protocol that uses the similar perception as SybilGuard, but provides a refined and close to reality results. In our trial for a million-node system, the number of Sybil nodes acknowledged is decreased by a factor or about 200 times. When the approaches based on fast-mingling social networks are regarded, SybilLimit’s assurance is at most a log and factor away from maximum. Ultimately, on the basis of three large-scale real-world social networks, the foremost proof that real-world social networks are really fast-mingling has been offered by us. This proves the basic supposition behind SybilLimit’s and SybilGuard’s approach.